An Examination of the Juristic Principle in Al-Hidayah: Testimonial Competence Entails Judicial Authority; and Its Applications

Abstract

This study examines and analyzes the Islamic jurisprudential maxim, "Kullu man kāna ahlan lil-shahādah yakūnu ahlan lil-qaḍāʾ, focusing on its jurisprudential foundations, legal implications, and applications within the Islamic judicial system according to the views of Ḥanafī jurists. The central problem concerns the relationship between eligibility for testimony (ahliyyat al-shahādah) and eligibility for judicial office (ahliyyat al-qaḍāʾ), and the extent to which the former constitutes a criterion for establishing the latter. The principal research question is whether fulfilling the conditions of eligibility for testimony is sufficient to establish eligibility for judicial office, and on what jurisprudential grounds this relationship rests. The study aims to clarify the maxim's theoretical and jurisprudential foundations, identify the common and distinctive conditions of testimony and judicial office, and assess its role in realizing judicial justice and protecting individual rights. The research is significant because judicial eligibility plays a fundamental role in ensuring justice, institutional integrity, and the proper administration of Islamic law. The study employs a descriptive-analytical methodology based on authoritative primary sources of Ḥanafī jurisprudence. The findings show that, according to Ḥanafī jurists, fulfilling the essential conditions of eligibility for testimony is necessary for eligibility for judicial office, as both testimony and judicial authority, despite differences in their nature and legal effects, fall within the broader framework of wilāyah (legal authority). Thus, the maxim provides a significant jurisprudential criterion for assessing judicial competence and promoting justice within the Islamic judicial system.