A Jurisprudential Study of the Rule That Killing Becomes Permissible When It Is the Only Means of Averting Killing and Its Applications

Abstract

The Islamic jurisprudential maxim, "When killing becomes the only means of preventing killing, it becomes permissible," is regarded as one of the significant principles governing homicide and legitimate legal self-defense. This maxim rests on the fundamental principles of preserving human life and preventing harm. This study aims to determine the scope and conditions governing the application of this maxim and to delineate the boundary between legitimate self-defense and unlawful aggression. The significance of the subject lies in its close connection to the protection of the right to life, the prevention of aggression, and the regulation of the defender's criminal responsibility. In contemporary circumstances, particularly in cases involving armed attacks and imminent threats to human life, its practical relevance has become increasingly evident. The study aims to clarify the jurisprudential foundations of this maxim and examine its application in safeguarding Muslims' sacred objects and securing justice among them. The research adopts a descriptive-analytical methodology, drawing upon authoritative sources of Hanafi jurisprudence and other Islamic legal works. The findings demonstrate that the permissibility of killing in such circumstances is not absolute; rather, it depends on the presence of an actual and imminent threat, the necessity of killing as the last effective means of averting the threat, and strict observance of the limits of necessity. The study concludes that taking life is permissible only when it is indispensable for protection and no other effective means of protection is available.